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ECONOMIC THEORIES OF THE FAMILY AND DISCRIMINATION IN A SOCIAL 
CONTEXT: ENTITLEMENTS OF KONDH TRIBAL FEMALES IN INDIA 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Economic theories of the family and gender discrimination within the family are examined in 
the context of Kondh dominated tribal villages in rural western Orissa, India, drawing on 
results from a survey of 106 wives. The survey involved direct interviews using a structured 
questionnaire. This article examines the relevance of economic unitary and bargaining 
theories of the family in this social context, drawing on background literature. Using the 
survey results, socioeconomic influences on the status of wives within their families are 
analysed and the entitlements of female and male children are compared and analysed. 
Because of cultural embedding, it is suggested that the relevance of economic theories of the 
family depend significantly on cultural context. In many cases, it seems that poverty has a 
negative influence on the social empowerment of females but it is not the only influence nor 
always a sufficient condition for discrimination against females. 
 
 
Keywords: Economic theories of family, gender inequality, human capital, poverty, resource 
endowments. 
 
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF THE FAMILY AND DISCRIMINATION IN A SOCIAL 
CONTEXT: ENTITLEMENTS OF KONDH TRIBAL FEMALES IN INDIA 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Resource endowments, and social entitlements to use these, are major factors influencing the 
economic wellbeing of individuals (Sen, 1981) and their ability to develop their innate 
abilities and so add to their stock of human capital (Tisdell, 2001). In turn, the latter can have 
important consequences for the state of the environment and for the sustainability of 
development (Tisdell, 2001). However, the effective resource endowments and entitlements 
of individuals within families depends largely on the processes of intra-family decision-
making or governance. To a considerable extent, these seem to be a product of the total social 
and cultural context in which the family is embedded (cf. Cain, 1982; Cain et a., 1979). 
 
Traditionally, economists have ignored the role of the family in economic decision-making 
and no standard microeconomic textbooks deals with this matter. Nevertheless in the last 
decades of the 20th century several economic theories of the family were developed. The two 
main types are unitary theories and bargaining theories. Becker (1981) was the first to 
develop the unitary theory of the family. It assumes that family decisions are made in 
accordance with a single utility function that is to be maximised. There is, however argument 
about how that utility function is to be derived. Possibilities include a team situation in which 
family members have common goals, or one in which the dominant family member e.g. 
dominant male, imposes his/her preferences. Dependent children play no direct role in the 
determination of the ‘family’s’ utility function but their future e.g. access to education, is 
heavily influenced by it. 
 
Bargaining theories of the family arose from criticism of the unitary model Bargaining 
theorists argue that there may be no utility function that determines the decisions of the 
family but rather decisions in the family depend upon the relative bargaining strength of 
family members (Schultz, 1990; Alderman et al., 1990; Haddad et al., 1997). In turn, 
following leads from game theory (e.g. Nash, 1950), many bargaining theorists argue that an 
improved understanding of family decisions about resource-use and entitlements can be 
obtained by considering the relative threat power of individual family members. This implies 
that progress in explaining the nature of family decisions and the comparative entitlements of 
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an individual in the family can be made by identifying factors that add to the relative threat 
power of individuals within the family. For example, the threat power of a wife in a family 
might be increased if she gains the ability to own productive property, such as land, in her 
own right, or is able to earn an independent income or can obtain a divorce with a settlement 
likely to give her a substantial amount of her family’s resources. 
 
Nevertheless, considerable caution is required in applying such theories because the extent of 
their relevance depends on the whole socio-cultural context in which the family is embedded 
(cf. Cain, 1982; Cain et al., 1979). This implies, for example, that social changes that 
empower wives in one society fail to do so in another, and indeed could even disempower 
them (cf. Tisdell, Roy and Regmi, 2001). This is especially likely when the social changes 
are partial rather than wide and pervasive. 
 
This article examines the resource endowments and entitlements of individuals in families in 
Kondh-dominated tribal villages in the Phulbani District in western Orissa drawing on the 
results of a structured field survey of wives in a sample of such villages. It pays particular 
attention to the status of wives and of female children compared to male children. It considers 
whether provision of various ‘entitlements’ or changes in the ‘rights’ of wives are likely to 
increase their threat power within the family and help empower them. In doing so, it 
investigates the extent to which the empirical result support existing economic theories of the 
family and identifies some important qualifications to these. This article also provides 
valuable primary data about socioeconomic conditions in these tribal villages in India. 
 
This article is developed by first providing background information about the groups (tribal 
and non-tribal) surveyed, the study area and the nature of the survey. The information from 
the survey about the resource endowments of wives and their families is reported. Following 
this, survey results for the entitlements of wives are outlined and their implications for the 
empowerment of wives are discussed in the light of existing theories. Next, survey data about 
children are presented and are analysed in relation to existing theories about desired size of 
family and its gender composition, the work-contribution of children and the entitlements of 
children depending on their gender. Finally, a concluding assessment is provided. 
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2. Background Information about the Groups Surveyed, the Study Area and the 
Nature of the Survey 
The population of the scheduled tribes of India is considerable and exceeds 67 million or 8% 
of India’s population (1991 Census of India). Tribals are believed to display less 
discrimination towards females than non-tribals (cf. Agnihotri et al., 1998). This is partly 
reflected in the higher female-male ratios for scheduled tribes as a whole compared to the 
remainder of India’s population. Nevertheless, most scheduled tribes are patriarchal, but not 
all. The Kondh scheduled tribe group surveyed for this study is patriarchal. 
 
A survey was undertaken in three rural settlements (villages) in 2000 in the Phulbani District 
in Orissa, India, of wives in 106 households to gather information about gender status, 
including entitlements of wives and of female children relative to male children using a 
structured questionnaire, the English version of which is given as Appendix B in Tisdell et 
al., 2002. Mrs Arati Nanda conducted the survey with the help of assistants by direct 
interview. Due to the fact that she, and some of her assistants, contracted malaria, a less 
extensive survey was completed than originally planned. 
 
The Phulbani District, sometimes known as the Khandarmal District, is located about 200 
kilometres due west of Bhubeneswar, capital of Orissa state. It is a forested plateau region 
and is relatively dry and hilly.  
 
It is also a tribal dominated region. At the 1991 Census, 51.5 percent of its population 
belonged to scheduled tribes. Also, 18.21 percent of its population belonged to scheduled 
castes. The literacy rate is low. In 1991, it was 37.23 percent and only 19.82 percent for 
females. The literacy rate for scheduled tribes was only 17.49 percent (compared to 34.51 
percent for scheduled Hindu caste members) indicating that literacy is least high among 
members of scheduled tribes. 
 
Main amenities are generally lacking in this district. For instance, only 38 percent of tis 
villages are electrified compared to 68 percent in Orissa as a whole. Agriculture is the main 
occupation. Farms are small with 80 percent being less than 2 hectares in size. Incomes are 
low and the district is considered to be economically poor. The Kondhs and other villagers 
also collect products from the forests and graze animals in the forests. Forest use adds 
significantly to their income. 
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 Only Kondhs (a scheduled tribe) and scheduled Hindu caste members live in the rural 
hamlets sampled. No members of the general Hindu castes are present. The subgroup of 
Kondhs living in the study area are Desai Kondhs. Their mother tongue is Kui, a Dravidian 
language, but Kondhs in the study area also speak or understand Oriya. 
 
The scheduled caste members intermingled with the Kondhs are called Panos or Dombs. 
They are often servants to the Kondhs and are usually landless and poor. In the Kondh-
dominated villages, the Dombs have a lower social status than the Kondhs. The origin of the 
Panos or Dombs is unclear. They too are highly dependent on non-timber forest products for 
their livelihood. In relation to female entitlements and status, considerable social convergence 
exists between the Kondhs and the Dombs as indicated by chi-square tests of our survey 
results (Tisdell et al., 2002). 
 
The settlements surveyed are located not far west of the main road at a distance of about 5 
kilometres south of Phulbani town (see Map 1). They are relatively close to one another and 
are Pitabari hamlet, Bandhasahi hamlet and Kaladi village. Interviews were with wives and a 
total of 106 wives from different households were interviewed. The distribution of 
respondents between the settlements and according to whether they are Kondhs or belong to 
the scheduled caste, as reported by Arati Nanda, is set out in Table 1. One hamlet contained 
no members of the scheduled caste but the others did contain such members. 
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Map 1   Generalised map of India showing the state of Orissa and Phublani, the major town 
near which the surveys were conducted. Border between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
is not shown. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of responding wives by settlement and whether Kondh or a scheduled caste 
member 
Settlement Kondh Scheduled Caste Total 
Pitabari hamlet(a) 15 0 15 
Bandhasahi hamlet(b) 10 10 20 
Kaladi revenue village(c) 54 17 71 
TOTAL 79 27 106 
Notes:  (a)  All households covered. 
(b)  All settlements on eastern side of hill covered. Those on the western side were not because they 
were considered too difficult to access because several interviewers contracted malaria. 
(c)  Three hamlets fully covered in this village. 
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3. Resource Endowments of Wives and Their Families and Economic Status 
 
The survey sought information on the following general matters: 
1. Socioeconomic attributes of respondents and their families. 
2. Property rights 
3. Assets and income  
4. Economic conditions and survival strategy 
5. Formal credit, production and marketing 
6. Social dynamics 
7. Education 
8. Children’s affairs – treatment of female and male children 
9. Status of wives 
 
However, information on all of these aspects is not reported here. 
 
Most of the wives interviewed considered their families to be very poor, as is suggested by 
their self-assessment of the economic status of their family, compared to other families in 
their village. Respondents were asked if they thought that their family in terms of its 
economic situation is in the top one-third, the middle one-third or the lower one-third in their 
village. The results are reported in Table 2. Results are biased towards the lower income 
categories refecting the fact that most respondents considered their families to be poor 
generally. At the 5% level, no significant difference exists between the responses of the 
scheduled tribe and the scheduled caste. However, a slightly higher proportion of the Dombs 
placed their family in the lower income category. These results are consistent with both 
groups of respondents being poor on the whole, with some indication that Dombs (SC) are 
somewhat poorer than the Kondhs (ST). Observe that self-assessment does not yield 33 
percent in each group as it technically should. Yet the results are indicative. 
6 
Table 2 
Self-assessment by respondents of their family economic status in the village compared 
to other families – Distribution of responses by frequency and relative frequency,  
in percentage(a) 
 
Response 
 
All 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
 
ST 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance 
Top one third 2 (4) 1 (2) 1 (4) (-2) Cri =(5.99) 
Middle one third 49 (46) 39 (49) 10 (37) (+12) C=(1.67) 
Lower one third 55 (52) 39 (49) 16 (59) (-10) Do not reject
Total response 106 (100) 79 (100) 27 (100)   
(a) Relative frequency in parentheses.  
Note: Self-assessment does not yield 33% in each group. 
 
None of the wives reported any ownership of land. Ninety three percent of respondent said 
that fundamental land ownership rights are held by males and the remainder did not answer 
the relevant question. 
 
In general, it was found that Dombs have fewer assets that Kondhs. They were also more 
likely to have insufficient income to provide two meals a day throughout the year, although 
the responses were not significantly different at the 5% level using the chi-squared test. The 
pervading poverty of these villagers as underlined by the fact that nearly half of the families 
surveyed are unable to supply two meals a day throughout the year. The results are reported 
in Table 3. Of those unable to provide two meals a day throughout the year, more than half 
(55%) stated that it was frequent. According to the chi-squared test, a significant difference 
occurred – Kondhs who were unable to provide two meals a day throughout the year were 
more likely to report that this was frequent compared to Dombs.  
 
Table 3 
Income sufficient for two meals a day throughout the year – Distribution of responses  
Response All 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
ST 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance 
Yes 59 (56) 47 (59) 12 (44) (+15) Cri -(3.84) 
No 47 (46) 32 (41) 15 (56) (-15) C= (1.84) 
No answer 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (-0) Do not reject 
Total response 106 (100) 79 (100) 27 (100)   
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Table 4 
For families unable to provide two meals a day throughout the year, is it frequent? – 
Distribution of responses  
Response All 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
ST 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance 
Yes 26 (55) 21 (65) 5 (33.3) (32.3) Cri -(3.84) 
No 21 (45) 11 (35) 10 (66.6) (-31.6) C= (4.31) 
Total response 47 (100) 32 (100) 15 (100)  Reject 
 
The wives interviewed had little or not formal education. Out of the 79 scheduled tribal 
wives, 60 (76%) had not formal education, and the remaining 19 had education varying from 
completion of class 1 to class 12. In comparison, 17 of the 27 (56%) scheduled caste wives 
interviewed had not education and the rest had education varying from completion of class 1 
to class 11. While the Domb wives had more formal education on the whole than the Kondh 
wives, the level of education of all these wives as a group was very low, even by Indian 
standards. 
 
Most of the Kondh wives with no education (52) mentioned poverty and cost of education as 
major contributors to their lack of education. Another six mentioned that girls spend time on 
household chores to help their family and are going to get married anyway, so education is 
not important for them. Of those Dombs who gave reasons why they had no formal 
education, 11 said it was because girls spend time on household chores to help the family and 
they are going to get married anyway, in which case they’ll leave the family. This suggests 
that educating daughters is not an attractive investment for their parents and would accord 
with the type of predictions expected from Gary Becker’s theory (Becker, 1981). Poverty was 
only mentioned as a reason by one Domb wife. 
 
It was found that over 40 percent of families rely mostly on the food they grow or collect as a 
source of food for household consumption, with the proportion being slightly higher for 
Kondhs than Dombs. Subsistence activities are very important for these villagers as a whole. 
For the whole group, it was most common (the mode) for the wife to provide for about 30% 
of the food requirements of the family with the husband supplying the remainder. However, 
for the Dombs the wife most frequently supplied one half of the food requirements of her 
family by collecting and growing food. Virtually all respondents agreed that the home garden 
is an important or very important source of food for their family. 
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 In relation to provision of cash income for their families, the most frequent contribution was 
found to be about 30 percent provided by the wife and 70 percent by the husband, and this 
was true for both Kondhs and Dombs. 
 
It emerges that both wives and husbands make a substantial contribution to the subsistence 
and cash income of their families. Wives reported that they earn money income by working 
in the rice fields of others during the planting and harvesting season (30 Kondhs and 13 
Dombs mentioned this); making baskets and other products from sal leaves collected in the 
forest and selling these in the market (47 Kondhs and 8 Dombs), selling firewood (6 Kondhs) 
and other activities such as stone crushing (4 Kondhs and 4 Dombs). We observe that the 
likelihood of wives working in the fields of others for cash is much higher for Dombs than 
for Kondhs. This may be because Dombs have less availability of land. There is, however, no 
indication that Domb wives achieve greater empowerment within their family than Kondh 
wives as a result of being more likely to be employed by others for cash. At least, this seems 
so from the result of the chi-squared tests reported in Tisdell et al. (2002). This accords with a 
similar finding of Tisdell, Roy and Regmi (2001) for Santal tribals and Hindu Bengali wives 
in the Midnapore District of West Bengal. It implies that in these rural social contexts, wives 
are not empowered within their family by working for others for cash income. It, therefore, 
throws doubt on the view that the prevalence of women working outside the home for cash 
income is a reliable indicator of their family empowerment within their families. Thus, the 
views of Anand and Sen (1995) and Agnihotri et al. (1988) in this regard must be treated 
cautiously (cf. Tisdell, Roy and Ghose, 2001). Whether or not women are empowered by 
working outside their home for income depends on the surrounding social context. In some 
rural social situations, such activity does not increase their bargaining power within their 
families. Their husbands often appropriate any cash income earned by wives and control its 
expenditure, and may even increasingly restrict the social interactions of a wife is she is 
working (cf. Tisdell, Roy and Regmi, 2001). Social and cultural factors, therefore, sometimes 
limit the application of economic theories of the family. 
 
4. Entitlements of Wives, Social Contacts and Bargaining Theories 
While bargaining theories have been proposed by several Western economists (Schultz, 1990; 
Alderman et al, 1995; Haddad et al., 1997) as a useful basis for predicting economic and 
other benefits to individuals within a family, they appear to be subject o important limitations 
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in some social contexts in India because of processes of acculturalisation. Such processes 
may lead to acceptance of inequalities within the family and an unwillingness to use (or even 
recognize) bargaining power, when it actually exists. Furthermore, bargaining power 
obtained from a threat strategy varies according to the total social context in which it exists. 
Results from our Orissa survey underline these points. 
 
All respondents reported that males are their household heads, except in two cases where 
widows are the heads. All wives stated that they required the permission of their family head 
(a male, where there is a male family member) to be involved in social groups or to perform 
tasks outdoors. 
 
All 106 respondents agreed that the following are the reasons why it is important for the wife 
to have the permission of the family head for involvement in social groups: 
(a) “In all important activities, it is important to have the support of the family head. 
(b) The head of the family remains the chief decision-maker.” 
The last statement, especially, indicates acceptance of traditional cultural values. 
Nevertheless, two-thirds of the women were involved in social groups or attempts to form 
social groups and a third were not so involved. The groups most commonly mentioned were 
women’s groups, such as Nari Sangh and Mahila Samiti, Domb wives were less likely to be 
involved in such activities than Kondhs and the difference was statistically significant at the 5 
percent level using the chi-squared test. This difference may reflect the lower social status of 
the Dombs in these communities and therefore, less social involvement by them. 
 
In relation to outside activities, all respondents argued that females require the permission of 
the family head to engage in outdoor activities. These include normal family chores such as 
gathering forest products, catching fish or fetching water as well as less regular activities 
such as selling the family’s produce, buying goods and outdoor recreation. 
 
In response to the question: “Do you feel that the restrictions imposed on your freedom of 
movement and to make decisions on important issues is a gender restriction i.e. because you 
are a female?”, all 106 respondents answered ‘No’. Their responses suggest that strong 
acculturalisation is present. Furthermore, all 106 respondents accepted the following 
statements (a) and (b) and 104 accepted statement (c) as reasons why they do not consider 
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such conventions a gender restriction, and this further emphasizes the overwhelming 
significance of acculturalisation of wives (cultural embedding) in this rural context: 
“ (a) My empowerment contributes to total family empowerment, hence total family 
consent and support are necessary. 
(b) Requirement to obtain consent of head/elders is a part of traditional culture and 
custom. 
(c) It is not gender restriction, as it is done out of affection and concern for welfare.” 
 
When asked if they felt that restrictions on their freedom of action should be removed, the 
overwhelming proportion of wives, 89% (94) said ‘No’, 10% (11) said ‘Yes’ and one wife 
did not respond. Thus most wives accept restrictions on their freedom of action, mostly 
imposed by males. This further underlines the significance of acculturalisation processes. 
 
Within rural Indian families, women are often deprived of medical attention when they need 
it with preference given to males. In a response to a question about this matter, 45% of wives 
reported going without medicine or medical attention when they needed it, with the 
proportion being higher from Dombs than Kondhs but not significantly so. The main reason 
given was lack of money. Furthermore, almost one-third of the wives interviewed reported 
going without food to make it available to their husband or children. This may not be purely 
self-deprivation but may partly be a consequence of custom. 
 
From the responses received, it seems that work and leisure patterns of both wives and 
husbands are similar. They usually spend 6-8 hours sleeping daily, 2-3 hours in leisure 
activities, such as chatting with neighbours and in the case of men, also singing and dancing. 
The remaining time is allocated to work. Hence the average workloads in these communities 
of males and females do not seem to be unequal. 
 
The majority of wives (56%) stated that their husbands would be pleased if they could work 
outside their house and earn cash income, but 39 percent said they would not be and 5 percent 
did not respond. The proportion of husbands in favour of such work for the wife was higher 
for Dombs than Kondhs, but not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For wives 
where their husband would be pleased for them to earn cash income, the main problem 
seemed to be to find job openings because the local economy is one with surplus labour. Note 
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that for a woman to work outside her home, permission is required from the head of the 
household. It is not an automatic entitlement. 
 
Respondents were asked whether their husband, the wife (herself) or both jointly controlled 
the spending of cash in their family. Most (81%) said it is controlled jointly, 15 percent 
reported that it is controlled by the husbands and 4 percent stated that it is controlled by the 
wife but these respondents were widows. If any bias, therefore, exists, it is in favour of the 
husband. In the case of joint decisions the relative influence of the husband and wife is 
unknown but it is likely that the husband’s impact is greatest. As is clear from an earlier 
question, the wife must have the permission of the head of the household to buy goods. 
 
In relation to the bargaining position of the wife within her family, three factors were 
considered: 
(a) the wife’s ability to inherit property; 
(b) her ability to sue for divorce and obtain a settlement in her favour; and 
(c) the ability of her blood kin to support her in any bargaining situation. 
 
All respondents stated that a wife does not inherit land or other economic resources in their 
communities. On the death of her husband the family’s property is inherited by the sons, with 
the largest share going to the eldest son. Daughters inherit nothing. Thus, females are 
effectively excluded from all inheritance of property. This seriously undermines the intra-
family bargaining position in relation to males. 
 
While women have the legal right of divorce and to start proceedings, there is strong 
customary opposition to it. Often consent of the husband is required, by custom, for a wife to 
sue for divorce. But since in the settlement, the wife obtains none of her family’s property, 
the cost to the wife is high. Therefore, using Nash’s indicator of threat power (Nash, 1950), 
divorce possibilities gives the wife virtually not threat power in relation to her husband. It 
does little to raise a wife’s economic status and entitlements in this context. Both lack of 
bargaining power by wives, as suggested by bargaining theories, and social and cultural 
embedding contribute to this outcome. 
 
Dyson and Moore (1981) argue that where a wife has close contact with her blood family 
after marriage, this raises her economic status and bargaining power within her family and 
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may improve the status of females generally. They explain the higher female-male ratios in 
southern India compared to northern India in terms of differences in patterns of family 
contact and family associations. Much closer contact is maintained between the wife’s kin 
and her new family in southern India than in the north. Indeed, since it is quite common for 
close cousins to marry in the south, their two families are often closely related and well 
known to each other. 
 
As for the Kondh-dominated villages surveyed by us, a wife invariably comes from another 
village, generally within 25 miles of the husband’s village. All wives live in their husband’s 
village normally in the house of the husband’s parents. Such a situation is mostly 
unfavourable to the wife in bargaining with her husband. Sixty percent of respondents 
reported that the husband’s family had more influence on their decision than the wife’s 
family, 34 percent said the influence is equal and six percent did not answer. While forty 
percent of wives said that their blood family could help them financially and morally in times 
of difficulty, 60 percent said that their family as not in a position to provide any financial 
help. This indicates that the poverty of a wife’ parents is likely to reduce her bargaining 
power within a family because her family is not able to provide material support for their 
daughter in times of difficulty. Indeed, parents of daughters in a poverty-stricken situation 
may try to sustain an unsatisfactory marriage situation of their daughter because they fear that 
she may become an economic burden on them if she separates from her husband or divorces 
him. Thus, poverty itself can be a major factor contributing to the inferior bargaining position 
of wives in a family. It can, in some circumstances, contribute to continuing discrimination 
against wives and females generally. 
 
Wives were asked whether important decision about the future of their children are made by 
their husbands, themselves or jointly. Eighty five percent (90) said jointly. The husband made 
the decision alone in few cases, the wife in one case and eleven wives did not respond. Thus 
considerable sharing of decisions by husbands and wives in this regard occurs. Nevertheless, 
it is still possible that the husband’s views carry the greatest weight in the final decisions 
about the future of children in the family. 
 
Now let us consider specific issues involving children, including any differences in the 
treatment of boys and girls within the family. 
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5. Matters Involving Children, their Gender Status and Entitlements 
The average number of children for family in the sample was low being 1.94 for Kondhs and 
1.88 for Dombs. In response to the question what is the ideal number of children for family, 
the majority of the respondents suggested two. Both Kondhs and Dombs preferred small 
families. The distribution of responses as shown in Table 5. 
 
 Table 5 
Ideal number of children according to SC & ST wives – Distribution of responses 
Response All 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
ST 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance 
49 (46) 35 (44) 14 (51) (-7)   
8 (8) 3 (4) 5 (19) (-15)  Cri -(9.48) 
36 (34) 31(39) 5(19) (+20)   
7 (7) 4 (5) 3 (11) (-6)  C= (11.73) 
6 (5) 6 (8) 0 (0) (8)  Reject 
106(100) 79 (100) 27 (100)    
 
Wives were asked their reason for their chosen ideal number of children. All stated that a 
small family is easily manageable in terms of care, education, food and clothing. 
 
Note that the average size of families and views about ideal size indicate that population 
growth of this group is around zero, and that the size of the family is a rational choice. In the 
latter respect, the outcome differs from the theory of Malthus. The results appear to support 
Beckers’ theory indirectly. It seems likely that since this is a labour surplus community, the 
demand for children as a source of labour is low, and the probability of survival of a male 
child able to assist his parents in old age or sickness, is higher when the smaller the size of 
the family. 
 
Wives were asked whether they prefer more sons than daughters, more daughters than sons or 
an equal number of sons or daughters. Most preferred (see Table 6) an equal number of boys 
and girls but more than one third preferred more boys than girls. Those who prefer sons gave 
as a reason that daughters will eventually get married and go away from the family. Thus 
they are not considered by these villagers to be an attractive long-term investment. Their 
preferences would seem to accord with Becker’s theory and human capital theory generally 
(Becker, 1981). 
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Table 6 
Preference for sons or daughters in family composition for SC & ST wives – 
Distribution of responses 
Response All 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
ST 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance 
More sons 
preferred 
38 (36) 29 (37) 9 (33) (+4)  
More daughters 
preferred 
1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (0) (+1) Cri –(7.81) 
Equal number of 
sons or daughters 
preferred 
66 (62) 48(61) 18(67) (-6)  
No answer 6 (5) 1 (1) 0 (0) (+1) C=(0.86) 
Total response 106 (100) 79 (100) 27 (100)  Do not reject
 
It is, of course, possible to desire more boys than girls in a family but not to discriminate 
between them once they are born. Several questions were asked to learn about the possibility 
of discrimination between children according to their gender. 
 
In relation to whether school age daughters go to school less frequently than school age sons, 
the majority of those who answered said ‘No’ but the non-response rate was 58%. There was 
not clear evidence that daughters were more likely to be kept home from school more 
frequently than sons, nor was there any clear evidence that they are more likely to be kept 
home from school to help with family chores. In relation to whether or not children help with 
family work, the non-response rate to this question was also high. Of those that responded, 
just over a half said that their children help with family work and just under a half said that 
they did not. The results are presented in Table 7. On the whole, it seems that children in this 
community may not be an important labour resource, and this could be because it is a labour-
surplus community. On the other hand, the non-responses could be by respondents who might 
have been worried to admit that they use child labour. 
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Table 7 
Children help with family work – Distribution of responses  
Response All 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
ST 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance
Yes 30 (28) 16(20) 14(52) (-32) Cri=(5.99) 
No 29 (27) 25 (32) 4 (15) (+17) C= (10.17) 
No answer 47 (45) 38 (48) 9 (33) (+15) Reject 
Total response 106 (100) 79 (100) 27 (100)   
 
 
While most respondents said that they planned to give an equal amount of education to their 
sons and daughters, those who showed a preference, expressed it on the whole, in favour of 
sons. There were, however, 29 non-responses but in some of these cases the question would 
not have been applicable. The results are presented in Table 8. The results suggest less 
discrimination in access of daughters to education than that experienced by their mothers. 
 
Table 8 
Education plan for children according to their gender – Distribution of responses 
Response All 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
ST 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance
More education 
to son 
19 (18) 16 (20) 3 (11) (+9)  
More education 
to daughter 
2 (2) 2(3) 0(0) (+3) Cri=(7.81) 
Equal education 
to son and 
daughter 
56 (53) 37 (47) 19 (70) (-23) C= (4.76) 
No answer 29 (27) 24 (30) 5 (19) (+11) Do not 
reject 
Total response 106 
(100) 
79 (100) 27 (100)   
 
Respondents were requested to rank the degree of importance of education for their children. 
The choice of rankings were ‘Very important’, ‘Important’, ‘Moderately important’ and ‘Not 
important’. Six did not respond but the remainder ranked it as important or very important. 
The wives in these communities put a high value on education of their children. 
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In times of food scarcity, preference is sometimes shown by Indian rural families in giving 
food to boys rather than girls (Konar, 2001; Tisdell, 2000). In this community, however, such 
discrimination is rare, as can be seen from Table 9, and appears to be absent in the case of 
access to medical treatment, as can be seen from Table 10. Unequal access of females and 
males to medical attention occurs in many Indian’s rural communities (Agnihotri et al., 
1998). These practices seem to have an economic basis because a son is viewed as a long-
term investment but a daughter is not because she will go to another family on marriage. 
Thus, the benefit of investing in the human capital of a daughter is seen as largely external to 
her family. Consequently, this type of externality can result in a socially inferior economic 
allocation of investment (in the Kaldor-Hicks sense) in human capital formation with 
daughters being relatively deprived of such capital. However, cultural factors seem to 
mediate this aspect in the Kondh-dominated villages surveyed by us. There is much stronger 
discrimination in favour of boys against girls in this respect in villages in West Midnapore 
occupied by Santal tribals and/or Hindu Bengalis (Tisdell, 2000). 
 
Table 9 
Gender Preference in allocating food to children according to gender in times of 
scarcity – Distribution of responses 
Response All 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
ST 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance 
Preference to sons 
during food shortage 
1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (0) (+1)  
Preference to 
daughters during food 
shortage 
0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) Cri=(3.84) 
Sons and daughters 
treated equally 
84 (79) 59 (75) 25 (93) (-18) C= (0.026) 
No answer 21 (20) 19 (24) 2 (7) (+17) Do not reject 
Total response 106 (100) 79 (100) 27 (100)   
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Table 10 
Gender preference in access to medical treatment of children – SC & ST  
– Distribution of responses 
Response All 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
ST 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
SC 
Frequency 
and 
relative 
frequency 
Difference 
in relative 
frequency 
(ST-SC) 
Significance 
Preference to sons  for 
medical treatment 
0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0)  
Preference to daughters 
for medical treatment 
0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) Cri=(3.84) 
Sons and daughters 
treated equally 
80 (75) 60 (76) 20 (74) (-2) C= (0.038) 
No answer 26 (25) 19 (24) 7 (26) (+2) Do not reject 
Total response 106 (100) 79 (100) 27 (100)   
 
Most wives said that the ideal age for marriage of a daughter is 18-20 years and for sons 25 
years. However, three stated 30 years as the ideal age for marriage of son and one suggested 
22 years. All agreed that later marriage of sons should not be a problem. On the other hand, 
the vast majority of respondents (almost 90%) said that a late marriage of daughters creates a 
problem because a social stigma is attached to it. Only 11 percent of the respondents said that 
the late marriage of a daughter does not create a problem. “If she earns [an economic 
consideration], she can stay at home until a suitable match is found” was the typical answer 
in those cases. Nevertheless, on the whole, there is pressure on daughters to marry at a 
relatively early age but not sons. In this respect gender discrimination is present. 
 
While gender discrimination, as far as children are concerned, does not seem to be nearly as 
strong in these Kondh dominated villages as in many other rural villages in northern India, it 
is not entirely absent. When it occurs, it is unfavourable to daughters. It seems probably that 
daughters are experiencing less discrimination than their mothers did as children and that 
they are likely to obtain more education than their mothers. This is a hopeful sign. 
 
6. Concluding Assessment 
It is important to relate economic theories of the family and discrimination to their social 
context. This article has done this by drawing on results form a survey of wives in Kondh 
dominated rural villages in western Orissa. The families in this tribal region are on the whole 
poor and their level of education and literacy is low. 
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Cultural factors or embedding were found to have an important influence on the 
empowerment of wives. It is clear from these results that the applicability of bargaining 
theories of the family depend on the cultural context in which they are applied. For example, 
the cultural context effects wives’ perceptions of available threat strategies and their 
likelihood of using these. Furthermore, the degree of threat posed by any particular strategy 
depends up on the whole set or package of available threat strategies. In other words, the 
availability of a single threat strategy is likely to have greater effect in a bargaining situation 
when it can be combined with other threat strategies. The whole, in this case, is greater than 
the sum of the individual parts. Because the threat strategies available to Indian rural wives 
are very limited compared to Western wives, they have little bargaining power within their 
family. 
 
Indian wives often lack bargaining power because they do not have property rights and do not 
inherit productive resources. Furthermore, it is difficult for them to obtain a divorce and more 
importantly, in any settlement they obtain no property and in northern Indian, a wife’s blood 
family has little or not influence on her family’s decisions. As a result of her poverty, a wife 
is often trapped in an unsatisfactory marriage relationship and her blood family is usually 
unable (and often unwilling) to assist her because of its poverty. Thus, poverty contributes to 
gender discrimination in such cases. A process of mutual causation is present. This combined 
with the fact that institutional changes on wide rather than a partial scale accompanied by 
change in community attitudes are needed to empower females means that the process of 
improving the social status of females in rural India is likely to be slow and difficult. But 
positive action by the Indian Government can help. In this regard, its law that at least one-
third of all representatives on local government bodies be women is a step forward. 
 
Although poverty often contributes to the inability of wives to pursue their social and other 
entitlements, it would be misleading to attribute discrimination against females purely to 
poverty or low incomes. Matriarchal tribal societies do exist in Northeast India e.g. the 
Khasias, and the tribals involved have relatively low incomes. However, their cultural context 
is different to that of the Kondh dominated villages considered her. Women own and inherit 
productive resources and wealth in such societies and this presumably adds significantly to 
their bargaining power. In fact, female bias is present in entitlements. The eldest daughter 
usually inherits the property of her family, for example. 
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Furthermore, rising incomes do not necessarily improve the status of females in all cultural 
situations. In India, as a whole, per capita incomes rose in the 20th century but female-male 
ratios (FMRs) declined until 1971 and since then have been relatively stationary at around 
930 females per one thousand males, according to the Census of India reports (cf. Konar, 
2001, p.26). There was a slight rise in India’s FMR from 927 to 933 in 2001 but this is 
probably largely due to rising life expectancy in India. This tends to increase the proportion 
of females in the older age group in a total population (Konar, 2001). These aggregate figures 
however, mask an alarming trend. The FMR for children of six years and under actually fell 
in India from 945 in 1991 to 927 in 2001 (Konar, 2001, p.29). This indicates that death of 
female children by abortion, infanticide and neglect has actually increased at a time when 
India’s per capita income has continued to rise. In fact, it seems that females may have been 
disadvantaged by India’s economic growth in terms of their chances (prior or after birth) of 
surviving to six years of age. Despite attempts by the Indian Government to stamp out 
foeticide of females on the basis of pre-birth determination of the sex of the unborn, this 
practice is said to be still widespread (cf. Konar, 2001). 
 
The above case study indicates that bargaining theories provide some useful insights into the 
status of wives. But, like all game-type theories, they must be related to the whole social and 
cultural context in which social interactions take place. Bargaining theories need to be 
applied cautiously because of the importance of cultural embedding and the complex social 
context involved. They are, at best, only partially able to explain social relationships in the 
family, entitlements and endowments. The same is true of unitary theories of the family and 
human capital theory when applied to the family. The latter often help to explain differences 
in the desired boy-girl ratio in the family and the entitlements provided to children according 
to their gender. Nevertheless, these theories are mediated by cultural and non-economic 
considerations. For instance, there is less discrimination against female children in the Kondh 
dominated villages considered in this survey than in villages in West Midnapore containing 
Santal tribals and Hindu Begalis (see Tisdell, 2000) even though the economic conditions and 
general social circumstances of the two sets of villages are similar. 
 
The process of uplifting the economic and social status of females and of empowering 
women in classical patriarchal societies, such as principally occur in India, is likely to be a 
slow one. No single policy change, such as the Indian Government’s law to ensure at least 
one-third representation of women in local government bodies (panchayats), will achieve it 
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but all such measures help. In the long-term, improvements in the status of females in India 
that ensure their adequate access to human capital and resource endowments can do much to 
improve human dignity and contribute positively to sustainable development (cf. Tisdell, 
2001). It is a long-term goal worth pursuing, and needs to be tackled on a broad front. 
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